Algorithmic Governance, Data Protection, and Democratic Accountability: A Comparative Legal Analysis of the European Union and China in the Regulation of Artificial Intelligence

Abstract

This article examines how artificial intelligence governance systems reshape legal accountability, institutional legitimacy, regulatory coordination, and democratic governance in the European Union and China. The study argues that AI regulation increasingly constitutes a foundational dimension of contemporary governance because algorithmic systems influence administrative decision-making, economic coordination, public surveillance, digital markets, and human-rights protection. Using comparative legal and socio-institutional analysis, the article investigates how the European Union’s rights-oriented regulatory constitutionalism and China’s state-centered digital governance framework produce divergent approaches to AI accountability, data protection, institutional oversight, and technological sovereignty. Drawing on constitutional documents, regulatory frameworks, judicial developments, OECD digital governance indicators, United Nations reports, World Bank governance datasets, and comparative legal scholarship, the findings demonstrate that AI governance effectiveness depends on institutional coherence, regulatory legitimacy, procedural accountability, and adaptive legal capacity. The comparison reveals that the European Union prioritizes fundamental rights protection, procedural transparency, and regulatory harmonization, whereas China emphasizes technological modernization, state coordination, and strategic digital sovereignty. The article contributes to legal scholarship by proposing a conceptual framework linking institutional capacity, algorithmic governance, legal accountability, democratic legitimacy, and sustainable socio-economic development. The findings further indicate that AI regulation may strengthen governance efficiency and innovation capacity while simultaneously generating tensions concerning surveillance expansion, institutional asymmetry, legal fragmentation, and democratic accountability when regulatory safeguards remain insufficient.